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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SHOOTING BLANKS: SMART GUN MANDATES 
AND THEIR CONCOMITANT CONSTITUTIONAL, REGULATORY, PUBLIC 
POLICY, AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The clamor for and against increased gun control in the wake of high-
profile shootings has become a cliché. Gun control proponents are quick to 
call for increased background checks, assault weapons bans, and the like,1 
while gun control opponents are just as quick to point out that the proposed 
gun control would have been ineffective in preventing the latest tragedy.2 As 
 
 1. See generally, The Editorial Board, As Congress Sleeps, More People Die, N.Y. 
TIMES, (May 27, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/opinion/as-cong
ress-sleeps-more-people-die.html (excoriating, in the wake of the Isla Vista shooting, Con-
gress’s failure to pass increased background check measures or further limit those allowed to 
possess firearms); Jonathan Topaz, Feinstein Links LAX to Gun Control, POLITICO, (Nov. 3, 
2013, 11:01 AM) http://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-live/2013/11/feinstein-links-lax-to-
gun-control-176578.html (Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s assertion that the shooting at the Los An-
geles International Airport underscores the need for increased gun control legislation); Mark 
Landler & Peter Baker, ‘These Tragedies Must End,’ Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 17, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/us/politics/bloomberg-urges-obama-
to-take-action-on-gun-control.html (mentioning gun control proposals following the Sandy 
Hook shooting); Andrew Rosenthal, Taking Note: A Gun for Every Person, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/23/a-gun-for-every-person/ (July 23, 2012, 5:01 
PM) (calling for increased gun control following the Aurora, Co. theater shooting); Blood-
shed and Invective in Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 9, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/01/10/opinion/10mon1.html (criticizing Arizona’s gun laws as “lenient” and call-
ing for more stringent gun control following the Tuscon shooting in which six died and thir-
teen were wounded, including Rep. Gabrielle Giffords). 
 2. See, e.g., Nation’s Strongest Gun Laws Didn’t Stop Rodger, INVESTORS.COM (May 
27, 2014, 7:01 PM), http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/052714-702335-elliot-rodger-
not-stopped-by-gun-control.htm (highlighting the spate of gun control laws passed following 
the Sandy Hook shooting, and noting that the shooter complied with both state and federal 
laws in acquiring his firearms and magazines); Nick Gillespie, Now is Not the Time for New 
Gun Laws, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 18, 2013, 3:10 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2013/09/18/now-is-not-the-time-for-new-gun-laws.html (emphasizing that despite increased 
calls for gun control in the wake of mass shootings, mass shootings are not increasing, and 
violent and gun-related crime is decreasing); Gene Healy, New Gun Laws Won’t Prevent 
Another Sandy Hook, REASON.COM (Apr. 16, 2013), http://reason.com/archives/2013/
04/16/new-gun-laws-wont-prevent-another-sandy (noting that neither the National Academy 
of Sciences nor the Centers for Disease Control could identify any regulation that meaning-
fully reduced gun violence); Richard A. Epstein, Will Banning Guns Prevent Another Auro-
ra?, DEFINING IDEAS (July 24, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/research/will-banning-guns-
prevent-another-aurora (noting the soundness of economic analysis supporting research sug-
gesting that stronger gun control laws correlate to increases in mass killings); Brian Doherty, 
Gun Control Wouldn’t Have Stopped Loughner, REASON.COM (Jan. 21, 2011), 
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technology marches on, a new avenue for zealous gun control proponents 
has taken shape—instead of banning popular firearms, some gun control 
proponents have begun proposing biometric security mandates.3 These man-
dates would require guns to be fitted with security technology that prevents 
their use—if handled by an unauthorized user.4 Unlike some proposed gun 
control mechanisms,5 biometric security—”smart gun”—technology could 
prevent those tragic shootings in which the shooter acquires his or her fire-
arms by stealing them from the lawful owner6 or a child accidentally shoots 
a playmate with an adult relative’s firearm.7 Such mandates have been en-
acted in New Jersey,8 and Senator Ed Markey of Massachusetts has pro-
 
http://reason.com/archives/2011/01/21/gun-control-wouldnt-have-stopp (examining changes 
in public attitudes towards gun control, and noting that proposed gun control solutions would 
not have prevented Loughner’s shooting). 
 3. Joe Nocera, The Gun Report, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://nocera.
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/the-gun-report-october-17-2013 (highlighting that New Jersey 
could be first state in the country to pass a law requiring guns sold in-state to be fitted with 
security devices that permit only the owner to fire them); see also Don’t Jump Gun on Smart 
Guns, DAILY RECORD, archive.dailyrecord.com/article/20131017/NJOPINION01/310170010/
Don-t-jump-gun-smart-guns (suggesting that while New Jersey’s adoption of a smart gun 
mandate is laudable, the market and technology are not yet able to support it). New Jersey’s 
mandate specifies that six months after the production model of a personalized handgun has 
become available in New Jersey or any other state, “no other type of handgun shall be sold or 
offered for sale by any registered or licensed firearms dealer in this State.” N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 2C:58 -2.2 to -2.3 (West 2005). 
 4. See Nocera, supra note 3. 
 5. See, e.g., INVESTORS.COM supra note 2. 
 6. See, e.g., Matt Apuzo & Pete Yost, Connecticut Shooter Adam Lanza’s Guns Were 
Registered To Mother Nancy Lanza: Official, HUFF POST CRIME (Dec. 15, 2012, 9:15 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/15/connecticut-shooter-guns_n_2306913.html (de-
tailing the weapons found at Sandy Hook after the shooting). 
 7. See, e.g., Tiffany Johnson, 8-Year-Old Boy Killed in Accidental Shooting in White 
County, NEWSCHANNEL5.COM, http://www.jrn.com/newschannel5/news/8-Year-Old-Boy-
Killed-In-Accidental-Shooting-In-White-County-270750691.html (last updated Aug. 11, 
2014). 
 8. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58 -2.5(a) (West 2005) (“On and after the first day of the 
sixth month following the preparation and delivery of the list of personalized handguns which 
may be sold in the State . . . no person registered or licensed . . . as a manufacturer, wholesale 
dealer of firearms, retail dealer of firearms . . . shall transport into this State, expose for sale, 
possess with the intent of selling, assign or otherwise transfer any handgun unless it is a per-
sonalized handgun or an antique handgun.”). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-2 a(5) (West 
2005) (including in handgun retail requirements that after the personalized handgun mandate 
go into effect “the handgun [be] identified as a personalized handgun . . . [or] an antique 
handgun”). New Jersey defines a personalized handgun as one that “incorporates in its de-
sign, and as part of its original manufacture, technology which automatically limits its opera-
tional use and which cannot be readily deactivated, so that it may be fired only by an author-
ized or recognized user [emphasis added].” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-1 dd (West 2005). 
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posed a similar requirement9 that all handguns “manufactured or sold in, or 
imported into the United States incorporate such technology.”10 
This note demonstrates that biometric security mandates—particularly 
fingerprint or palm-print security devices for handguns—regardless of their 
purported effectiveness, are of dubious legality, and given the difficulty of 
implementing such a mandate,11 may best be consigned to science fiction.12 
Part II of this note delves into the backgrounds of handgun13 and biometric14 
technology and details current Second Amendment15 jurisprudence.16 Part III 
of this note discusses constitutional issues involved with a smart gun man-
date,17 regulatory issues created by such a mandate,18 public policy issues 
implicated by a smart gun mandate,19 and practical issues with implementing 
a mandate.20  
II. BACKGROUND 
“God made some men big and some men small, but Sam Colt made 
them all equal.”21 Handgun technology has advanced at a moderate pace 
 
 9. Markey Announces New Legislation, Efforts to Combat Gun Violence, U.S. SENATOR 
ED MARKEY OF MASS. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/
markey-announces-new-legislation-efforts-to-combat-gun-violence. 
 10. Handgun Trigger Safety Act of 2014, S. 2068, 113th Cong. 
 11. Civilians in the United States own approximately 270 million firearms. Cambridge 
University Press, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007: GUNS AND THE CITY 39 
(2007). Though in the first half of the twentieth century the majority of firearms manufac-
tured in the United States were long guns, by the 1980s handguns had expanded to approxi-
mately half of the civilian market. Id. at 63. As of 2009, Americans owned an estimated 114 
million handguns. William J. Krouse, Gun Control Legislation, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, Nov. 14, 2012, available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32842.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., DREDD (Lionsgate 2012) (featuring a handgun keyed to the user’s palm-
print); SKYFALL (Columbia Pictures 2012) (arming James Bond with a fictional Walther 
PPK/S model equipped with a palm-print security device); JUDGE DREDD (Buena Vista Pic-
tures 1995) (featuring a handgun keyed to the user’s palm-print that delivers an electric shock 
to unauthorized users); LICENSE TO KILL (MGM 1989) (featuring a “camera-gun” which will 
only fire after recognizing James Bond’s fingerprints on the grip). 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See infra Part III.A. 
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. See infra Part III.C. 
 20. See infra Part III.D. 
 21. T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE TEXANS 563–64 (De 
Capo Press 2000) (quoting a Texas proverb). 
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since Samuel Colt received his revolver patent in 1836.22 This pace seems 
positively glacial when compared with the rate at which biometric technolo-
gy has progressed from its almost contemporaneous roots.23 Particularly in 
recent years, biometric identification and authorization has expanded from 
the use of fingerprints to the use of retinae,24 blood vessel patterns,25 and 
DNA.26 
Parts A and B of this section show how handgun technology remains 
largely mechanical and unsophisticated, particularly when compared with 
biometric identification technology. Part C focuses on federal Second 
Amendment jurisprudence; recent litigation has focused on overturning total 
bans on handgun ownership,27 and relatively little has been said about the 
types of arms protected by the Second Amendment.28 
 
 22. See Jessica MacNeil, Samuel Colt Receives Patent for His Revolver, February 25, 
1836, EDN NETWORK (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.edn.com/electronics-blogs/edn-moments/
4407683/Samuel-Colt-receives-patent-for-his-revolver--February-25--1836. 
 23. Henry Faulds proposed using fingerprints to identify persons in crime scene investi-
gations in an article published in 1880. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE 
FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 13–14 (National Institute of Justice 2012) [hereinafter THE 
FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK]. 
 24. See, e.g., Robyn Moo-Young, Note, “Eyeing” the Future: Surviving the Criticisms 
of Biometric Authentication, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 421, 423–24 (2001) (noting the use of 
retina scans in place of ATM pin numbers in some Japanese banks beginning in 1997). The 
possible use of retinae for identification was recognized as far back as 1935. Science: Eye 
Prints, TIME MAGAZINE, Dec. 16, 1935, available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,755453,00.html. 
 25. See, e.g., Biometric Device Uses Blood Vessels to Identify People, BBC NEWS (Nov. 
13, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-20316159 (describing a bio-
metric security system that reads the pattern of blood vessels in the user’s finger). 
 26. See, e.g., Stephen Mayhew, Pentagon to Test Rapid DNA Biometric Technology, 
BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.biometricupdate.com/201210/pentagon-
to-test-rapid-dna-biometric-technology (describing a quick DNA test machine the military 
hopes to use for rapid identification of casualties in the field). 
 27. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (invalidating 
Chicago’s ban on handgun ownership by incorporating the Second Amendment against the 
states under the Fourteenth Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) 
(invalidating Washington, D.C.’s blanket ban on handgun ownership under the Second 
Amendment). 
 28. But see Heller, 554. U.S. at 625–28 (interpreting precedent and the Second Amend-
ment as protecting those arms in common use for lawful purposes); see also United States v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a 
short-barreled shotgun had no “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a 
well regulated militia,” and so was not protected by the Second Amendment). 
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A. Handgun Technology  
Handguns have progressed slowly in the nearly one-hundred eighty 
years since Samuel Colt’s received a patent for his revolver,29 from the icon-
ic revolvers of the 19th Century to John M. Browning’s Model 1911 U.S. 
Army pistol30 to modern polymer-framed handgun designs like Gaston 
Glock’s line of Glock pistols.31 
Mechanically, revolvers and semi-automatic pistols operate quite dif-
ferently. Revolvers are handguns that feature a revolving cylinder that usual-
ly holds five or six rounds.32 Pulling the trigger of a double-action revolver 
turns the cylinder, cocks the hammer, and fires the round.33 After shooting 
the five or six rounds loaded into the cylinder, it must be swiveled to the 
side so that new cartridges may be loaded.34 Semi-automatic pistols are more 
complex mechanically than revolvers—each time a round is fired, the spring 
in the magazine (usually a detachable box into which cartridges are loaded) 
pushes the next round into the chamber after the empty shell is ejected.35 
Reloading a semi-automatic handgun is much easier than reloading a 
handheld revolver—not only do the magazines generally hold many more 
rounds than the revolver’s cylinder, but the shooter must merely eject the 
spent magazine and insert a fresh one.36 
Despite their starkly different design aesthetics, Browning’s 1911 and 
Glock’s Glock 17 both function by the same semi-automatic principles.37 
This is all the more remarkable given the nearly three-quarters of a century 
that separated their development. That said, even the modern Glock is a 
complicated piece of machinery. Despite the complexity of the design, the 
very nature of a semi-automatic firearm requires it to withstand repeated 
explosions—one of the requirements the Austrian Army had for its service 
 
 29. MacNeil, supra note 22. Prior to the revolver, handguns were either single-shot or 
featured multiple barrels. Id. 
 30. See PATRICK SWEENEY, 1911: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 15–16 (Dan Shideler 
2010) (discussing the longevity of Browning’s pistol design, which was first adopted by the 
U.S. Army in 1911). 
 31. See, e.g., PAUL M. BARRETT, GLOCK: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S GUN 16–17 (1st ed. 
2012) (highlighting the competition the Glock 17 pistol faced in its bid to become the Austri-
an Army’s duty pistol in 1982). 
 32. Id. at 10. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. The main mechanical difference between the two handguns is the safety. Most pis-
tols feature mechanical safeties that must be disengaged so that they may be fired. BARRETT, 
supra note 31, at 11. The Glock 17, however, was instead equipped with a “trigger safety”—a 
device built directly into the trigger that must be depressed before the trigger could be pulled. 
Id. at 28. 
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pistol in the early 1980s was that it have no more than one failure per thou-
sand rounds fired, and that it have a service life of 40,000 rounds.38 
B. Biometric Technology 
Despite the proposed earlier use of fingerprint identification in criminal 
investigation,39 only recently has technology enabled its real-time use as an 
authentication device.40 Several different methods exist by which finger-
prints may be scanned, including optical, capacitive, and thermal.41 
Optical sensors take an image of the fingerprint.42 Capacitive sensors 
build an image of the fingerprint based on the difference in electrical capaci-
tance between the friction ridges on the finger and the air between those 
ridges.43 Thermal scanners measure the difference in temperature over time 
as a finger is swept across the sensor in order to generate the image.44 
These methods—as well as other similar security methods, such as ra-
dio-frequency identification45 (RFID) chips46 and watches47—require power 
sources. Until recent developments, many fingerprint scanners were bulki-
 
 38. Id. at 11. 
 39. THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 13–14. 
 40. See, e.g., iPhone 5s Features, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone-5s/features/ (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2013) (introducing a fingerprint identity sensor as a method to lock and un-
lock the newest model of Apple’s iPhone); Jack M. Germain, IBM Introducing Fingerprint 
Reader into Laptop, TECHNEWSWORLD (Oct. 4, 2004), http://www.technewsworld.com/
story/37017.html (describing IBM’s “first-of-its-kind biometric security subsystem). 
 41. NTSC SUBCOMMITTEE ON BIOMETRICS, Fingerprint Recognition, pg. 3, 
BIOMETRICS.GOV (Aug. 7 2006), http://www.biometrics.gov/documents/fingerprintrec.pdf. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 4. 
 44. Id. 
 45. After equipping an item with a radio-frequency identification transponder (which 
contains digital information about that item), the transponder’s stored data is extracted with a 
reader. Reepal S. Delal, Note, Chipping Away at the Constitution: The Increasing Use of 
RFID Chips Could Lead to an Erosion of Privacy Rights, 86 B.U. L. REV. 485, 487–88 
(2006). These chips are frequently used commercially to expedite supply chain response time. 
Id. at 488. The “E-Z Pass” system automatically pays tolls when a transponder-equipped car 
drives through a tollbooth—the car need not come to a complete stop, because the transpond-
er-reader communication does not require line of sight. Id. at 490–91. 
 46. See, e.g., Cynthia Leonardatos et al., Smart Guns/Foolish Legislators: Finding the 
Right Public Safety Laws, and Avoiding the Wrong Ones, 34 CONN. L. REV. 157, 182–84 
(2001) (discussing problems inherent in using an RFID chip as a firearm security device, 
including the necessity of a power source, the requirement that the user wear some object in 
which the firearm’s paired RFID chip is implanted, and the possibility that other radio-wave-
emitting-devices might interfere with the firearm’s operation). 
 47. See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 3 (discussing a firearm that may only be fired when the 
shooter is wearing a special watch that is paired to that firearm). 
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er;48 now, they are incorporated into smart phones.49 Other non-fingerprint- 
or palm-print-based biometric security approaches would be inconvenient if 
used in the firearm context, given current technology:50 retina scanners are 
self-evidently impractical;51 voiceprint matching would require the user to 
speak in order to use the firearm, and could fail if stress or other environ-
mental factors prevent the user’s voice from matching the reference sam-
ple;52 and even the modern “fast” DNA biometrics can take up to ninety 
minutes to provide results—far too long to wait in an emergency.53 For fire-
arm security, fingerprinting, or palm-print scanning is the only conceivable 
practical biometric security approach based on current technology. 
C. Second Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of the Second Amendment, rather than 
progressing at the relatively quick pace of advances in biotechnology, has 
moved along instead at the much slower rate of change of handgun technol-
ogy. Prior to United States v. Miller,54 the Supreme Court had addressed in 
its Second Amendment jurisprudence whether the Amendment applied to 
the states.55 Though the Court held that the Amendment only prohibited in-
fringement by Congress, these cases were decided before the doctrine of 
selective incorporation was implemented.56 With Miller, the Court squarely 
addressed the type of arm protected by the Amendment, and held that only 
those weapons related to the efficiency or preservation of the well-regulated 
militia fell under the Amendment’s ambit.57 
 
 48. See, e.g., Jennifer Sullivan, Portable Fingerprint Scanners Aid King County depu-
ties, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 18, 2012, 6:25 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019
468300_fingerprints19m.html (describing smart-phone-sized portable fingerprint scanners in 
use by local deputies). 
 49. See, e.g., APPLE, supra note 40. 
 50. See Leonardatos, supra note 46, at 186. 
 51. John Trader, Iris Recognition vs. Retina Scanning – What are the Differences?, 
M2SYS BLOG ON BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY (June 11, 2012), http://blog.m2sys.com/bio
metric-hardware/iris-recognition-vs-retina-scanning-what-are-the-differences/ (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2014) (explaining that retina scans project a beam of infrared light through the pupil 
as the person looks through the eyepiece, and the amount of light reflected is measured). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Mayhew, supra note 26. 
 54. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 55. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (limiting the Second 
Amendment’s protection against infringement to infringement by Congress and not the 
states). See also Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (restating Cruikshank’s holding 
that “shall not be infringed” limits only Congress), and Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 
(1894) (citing Cruikshank and stating again that the Second Amendment’s language prohibits 
only federal action). 
 56. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031. 
 57. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
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The Court’s holding in Miller remained the law of the land until Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller58 in 2008, when the Court reinterpreted Miller in 
conjunction with the history of the Amendment59 to hold that only those 
weapons “not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purpos-
es” are not protected by the Amendment60—that is, the weapons protected 
by the Amendment are those “‘in common use at the time.’”61 The Court 
then incorporated this right against the states in McDonald62 without further 
addressing the type of weapons protected. 
Though the Second and Seventh Circuits have split on whether the 
Second Amendment similarly protects the right to bear arms,63 they have not 
addressed the common-use requirement.64 Other federal circuits have ad-
dressed it—in Heller v. District of Columbia,65 the appellate court agreed 
with Mr. Heller that assault weapon and large-capacity magazines are in-
deed in “common use,” but upheld a prohibition on their possession within 
the District under an intermediate scrutiny analysis;66 in United States v. 
Chester,67 that circuit upheld prohibitions on firearm possession by domestic 
violence misdemeanants, and emphasized that the “common use” be the 
common use for a “law-abiding, responsible citizen;”68 in United States v. 
Marzzarella,69 the court determined that firearms whose serial numbers had 
been destroyed were not protected under Heller’s “common use” litmus 
test;70 and in United States v. Fincher,71 the court held that machine guns are 
not in common use by law-abiding citizens and so are not protected by the 
Second Amendment.72 The Supreme Court’s “common use” requirement 
leaves much to be desired—it seemingly waffles between a quantitative as-
 
 58. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 59. Id. at 625. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 62. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031. 
 63. Compare Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (overturning Illi-
nois’s total ban on the carrying of firearms, whether open or concealed), with Kachalsky v. 
County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 100 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding New York’s requirement 
that an applicant for a license to carry a concealed firearm show good and proper cause be-
fore such license is issued). 
 64. In his dissent in Heller, Justice Breyer took issue with this very requirement, noting 
that it defines the permitted arms based on the state of firearm regulation, and results in circu-
lar reasoning. Heller, 554 U.S. at 720–21 (Breyer J., dissenting). 
 65. 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Heller II]. 
 66. Id. at 1261–64. 
 67. 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 68. Id. at 682–83. 
 69. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 70. Id. at 99–101. 
 71. 538 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 72. Id. at 874. 
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sessment and qualitative assessment of a firearm’s use.73 A narrow reading 
of the common use standard would be inconsistent with the Court’s treat-
ment of other constitutional rights.74 
III. ARGUMENT 
The nature of handguns and their legal use along with the current state 
of biometric security technology severely limit any gun control approaches 
that mandate biometrically secured handguns. Would requiring all handgun 
owners to turn in their guns or fit them with fingerprint security devices be 
constitutional—or even practical? Who will ensure gun owners comply with 
this mandate? How will this mandate affect public policy? 
Part A of this section examines constitutional issues involved with 
mandating smart guns. Part B discusses regulatory issues this mandate could 
create. Part C considers public policy issues implicated by this mandate. 
And Part D analyzes practical limitations on mandating smart guns. 
A. Constitutional Issues Involved with Mandating Smart Guns 
In Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment protected com-
mon use of weapons for lawful purposes by the law-abiding citizen.75 
Though the D.C. Circuit declined to extend this protection to assault weap-
ons in Heller II,76 it focused on the nature of the use.77 In Heller, the Su-
preme Court noted that the handgun had been chosen overwhelmingly by 
society for self-defense—the Second Amendment’s “central” lawful pur-
pose.78 Banning such a class of arms, the Court noted, would fail constitu-
tional muster regardless of the standard of scrutiny applied.79 
 
 73. Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1563–64 (2009) (noting that Heller’s 
language has no supporting statistics, implying that “common use” is a qualitative judgment, 
and similarly implying that regardless of whether handguns were statistically preferred for 
self-defense, or normatively preferred for self-defense, the handgun ban imposed by the Dis-
trict of Columbia would fail constitutional muster). 
 74. Nicholas J. Johnson, The Second Amendment in the States and the Limits of the 
Common Use Standard, 4 HARVARD L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE, at 11, (Apr. 8, 2010), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722955 (noting additionally that 
the features which make firearms susceptible to gun bans are those very same features that 
make firearms useful for self-defense). 
 75. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
 76. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261–64. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 79. Id. at 628–29. 
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The handgun—the “quintessential self-defense weapon”80—may not be 
rendered unusable for self-defense by statute.81 The Supreme Court invali-
dated the District of Columbia’s requirement that firearms in the home be 
rendered inoperable at all times.82 Because an inoperable firearm would not 
be useable for the Second Amendment’s core purpose—self-defense—the 
District’s attempted regulation of firearms in the home was thus further 
preempted.83 
At first blush, Heller’s “common use” test does not seem applicable. 
Smart guns and biometric security technology are nascent at best. A smart 
gun mandate, however, would require that only handguns equipped with 
biometric security measures be sold henceforth.84 If possession of “dumb 
guns” were not simultaneously outlawed, the mandate’s effectiveness would 
be severely curtailed, given the estimated 114 million handguns owned by 
the public as of 2009.85 
“Dumb guns” are in common use. The very nascent nature of biometric 
technology works against its mandate—under Heller’s “common use” lan-
guage, it is not “dumb guns” which could be banned, but smart guns—they 
are at best in limited use, and because of the potentially inoperable aspect of 
 
 80. Id. at 629. 
 81. Id. at 630. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. New Jersey’s mandate, once it takes effect, allows only the sale of personalized 
handguns and antique handguns. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-2 a(5) (West 2005). Antique fire-
arms are those incapable of being fired or firing fixed ammunition (regardless of date of 
manufacture) or those manufactured before 1898 for which cartridge ammunition is not 
commercially available (if it is possessed as a curiosity, ornament, or for its historic value). 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-1 a (West 2005). Pre-mandate handgun owners in New Jersey are 
unaffected by the mandate. Id. 
 85. Firearms are durable goods—they are useful for long periods of time. United States 
v. Goodwin, 552 Fed. Appx. 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Pritchett, 40 
Fed. Appx. 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Firearms are durable goods . . .”)); United States v. 
Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1384 (quoting United States v. Singer, 943 F.2d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 
1991) (“[F]irearms, unlike drugs, are durable goods useful to their owners for long periods of 
time.”)). Any mandate that did not account for the more than 270 million privately owned 
firearms in the United States would be of limited effectiveness. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY, 
supra note 11, at 39. See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 809 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “du-
rable goods” as ‘[c]onsumer goods that are designed to be used repeatedly over a long peri-
od”). See also Krouse, supra note 11. The United States firearm industry manufactured ap-
proximately five million handguns in 2012. Firearms Commerce in the United States: Annual 
Statistical Update: 2014, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, & EXPLOSIVES, availa-
ble at http://www.atf.gov/sites/default/files/assets/statistics/CommerceReport/firearms_com
merce_annual_statistical_report_2014.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). Even if the entire 2012 
handgun manufacture output were sold in the domestic civilian market (and not exported or 
sold to the military or law enforcement), it would take nearly thirty five years of production 
and sale at that rate for smart guns to reach parity with conventional handguns. Id. 
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the technology.86 Because smart guns are new and not widely adopted, it is 
conceivable that they—and any other experimental weapons technology that 
has yet to reach whatever critical mass is required to qualify as “common 
use”—could be banned under Heller’s common use test. Whether that test is 
quantitative—based on the extent to which society has adopted smart 
guns87—or quantitative—based on the perceived value to society of the 
banned dumb guns88—a smart gun mandate would not pass constitutional 
muster. 
B. Regulatory Issues Created by Mandating Smart Guns 
Biotechnology regulation is incredibly complex.89 Not only are multi-
ple federal administrative agencies involved in its regulation, but the various 
state legislatures and state regulatory agencies can also involve themselves 
in the regulation of biotechnology.90 These various agencies have chosen to 
operate their regulatory programs in a coordinated fashion.91 
Mandating handgun biometric security measures, however, could upset 
this careful balance. Biotechnology is currently regulated by a pastiche of 
agencies, including the FDA, USDA, EPA, DOD, DOE, NIH, and 
BSCC92—bringing firearms into the mix would necessarily involve the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE).93 The 
 
 86. This note examines smart guns and biometric security mandates from a Second 
Amendment perspective. Other constitutional issues with a smart gun mandate and prohibi-
tion of “dumb guns” are readily apparent: under Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), 
the Supreme Court held that a mandatory registration scheme for otherwise outlawed weap-
ons violated the accused’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. Id. at 
99–100; similarly, a mandatory collection of “dumb guns,” were it conducted without recom-
pense, would violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 87. See Gould, supra note 73, at 1563–64. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Mark Mansour et al., Regulating Biotechnology: Science, Ethics, Law, and 
Governance Meet Head On in the Age of Informed Ignorance, 21 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 
93, 96–97 (2003) (describing the roles of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the 
United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in regulating biotechnol-
ogy). See also Linda Maher, The Environment and the Domestic Regulatory Framework for 
Biotechnology, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 133, 139–64 (describing, in addition to the agencies 
listed by Mansour supra, the roles of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee 
(BSCC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Defense (DOD), the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Energy (DOE)). 
 90. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 81, at 173–75. 
 91. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302, 
23303 (June 26, 1986). 
 92. See Maher, supra note 81. 
 93. 28 U.S.C. § 599A(b)(1) (2006) (entrusting the BATFE with the investigation of 
criminal and regulatory violations of federal firearms laws). 
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BATFE is primarily concerned with licensing those who do business in the 
firearms industry.94 Because all firearm manufacturers must be licensed by 
the BATFE, it follows that any manufacturer of a handgun with an integral 
biometric security device—whether that device is a fingerprint, blood, or 
DNA scanner—must also be so licensed.95 
Aside from fingerprint or palm-prints, other biometric technologies 
may bring the BATFE’s licensing scheme into conflict with the host of other 
agencies tasked with regulating biological technologies. This would further 
complicate an already muddled regulatory regime, and the addition of an-
other regulatory hurdle could actually discourage the development of hand-
gun biometric security systems.96 Given the current state of biotechnology 
regulation, the only biometric security systems that the BATFE could con-
ceivably implement without inter-agency coordination would be non-
invasive biometric security systems such as fingerprint or palm-print scan-
ners, retina scanners, or voiceprint scanners. 
C. Public Policy Issues Implicated by Mandating Smart Guns 
The law, in its majestic equality, permits the poor as well as the rich to 
defend their homes with handguns.97 And yet the poor have been the target 
of gun control in the past; President Clinton’s policy of warrantless searches 
in Chicago housing projects was struck down as unconstitutional—a policy 
that had been implemented despite the fact that crime statistics showed that 
 
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (2006) (“No person shall engage in the business of importing, 
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms . . . until he has filed an application with and received a 
license to do so from the Attorney General.”). 
 95. The BATFE recommends that a gunsmith obtain a firearm manufacturer’s license if 
he is creating or altering firearms, doing so as part of a regular business, and doing so in 
order to sell or distribute those firearms. May a Person Engage in Gunsmithing under a 
Dealer’s License (type 01), or Do Gunsmiths Need to Be Licensed as “Manufacturers” of 
Firearms?, ATF.GOV, https://www.atf.gov/content/may-person-engage-gunsmithing-under-
dealer’s-license-type-01-or-do-gunsmiths-need-be (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). Because the 
New Jersey mandate requires personalized handguns incorporate security devices “as part of 
the original manufacture,” a manufacturer of handguns subject to the mandate would neces-
sarily be licensed as a firearm manufacturer by the BATFE. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-1 dd 
(West 2005). 
 96. See, e.g., Wes Siegner & Paul M. Hyman, Medical Food Mumbo Jumbo: Confusing 
FDA Guidance Documents Will Discourage Medical Food Development, FDA LAW BLOG, 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/09/medical-food-mumbo-
jumbo-confusing-fda-guidance-documents-will-discourage-medical-food-development.html 
(Sept. 18, 2013). 
 97. My apologies to Anatole France, author of THE RED LILY (1894), from whence this 
line has been modified. 
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nonresidents were responsible for the high crime rate.98 A new Glock 17 
handgun retails at a suggested price of $599.99.99 A similar polymer-framed 
handgun from Smith & Wesson, the M&P 9mm, is sold at a suggested retail 
price of $569.99.100 Budget polymer-framed handguns can be had for sug-
gested retail prices as low as $179.101 For the poor, even a price just below 
$200 might be too expensive. And yet the right of self-defense that lies at 
the core of the Second Amendment102 is a right of all law-abiding citizens, 
not merely those affluent enough to afford the highest quality handguns. The 
core of this right is borne out in poll responses—sixty per cent of firearm 
owners own their guns for personal safety or protection.103 
The addition of a biometric security device, whether of the fingerprint 
scanner type incorporated into the $199 contract-laden iPhone 5s 16 GB 
model104 or the $2,000 portable DNA scanner in development for the gov-
ernment,105 will increase the cost of any handgun in which it is incorpo-
rated.106 For some, even a small increase in cost could price them out of ex-
 
 98. Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 
22 (1995) (quoting Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros’s remarks 
in a Feb. 4, 1994 press conference). 
 99. See, e.g., Glock G17 9mm High Capacity Pistol, BASS PRO SHOPS, http://www.
basspro.com/GLOCK-G17-9mm-High-Capacity-Pistol/product/10218314/ (last visited Oct. 
26, 2013); Glock 17 Generation 4 Handgun, GANDER MTN., http://www.gandermountain.
com/modperl/product/details.cgi?i=618746 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
 100. Smith & Wesson M&P 9mm – No Thumb Safety, SMITH & WESSON, http://www.
smith-wesson.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/Product4_750001_750051_769001_-1_7577
81_757781_757781_ProductDisplayErrorView_Y (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
 101. Handguns – 9mm, HI-POINT FIREARMS, http://www.hi-pointfirearms.com/hi-point-
handguns/9MM_handguns.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
 102. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
 103. Art Swift, Personal Safety Top Reason Americans Own Guns Today, GALLUP 
POLITICS (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165605/personal-safety-top-reason-
americans-own-guns-today.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 104. See Shop iPhone, APPLE, http://store.apple.com/us/buy-iphone/iphone5s (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2013). 
 105. See Mayhew, supra note 26. 
 106. Kodiak Industries has patented an aftermarket fingerprint locking system for 1911 
model handguns. Intelligun, KODIAK INDUSTRIES, http://kodiakarms.com/product/intelligun/ 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2014). Its retail price is $399. Id. This price is double the cost of the 
least expensive polymer-framed handguns discussed in the text accompanying notes 99–101, 
supra. A 1911-style handgun could cost, depending on quality, anywhere from $453 to 
$7,995. Compare Rock Island 1911 Semi Auto Pistol .45 ACP 5” Barrel 8 Rounds Wood 
Grips Parkerized, CHEAPER THAN DIRT, http://www.cheaperthandirt.com/product/7-G51431 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2014), to Pinnacle Model, WILSON COMBAT, http://wilsoncombat.
com/new/handgun-pinnacle.asp#.VD9Di77sClI (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). On the inexpen-
sive end, the Intelligun accessory essentially doubles the price of the handgun. The Intelligun 
system does not satisfy the New Jersey personalized handgun mandate’s trigger requirements 
because not only is it not yet available, but as an aftermarket accessory, it is not incorporated 
into the design of the personalized handgun at its original manufacture. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:39-1 dd (West 2005). 
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ercising the constitutionally guaranteed right to self-defense.107 Given that 
approximately one-third of serious violent crime108 victims in 2012 were 
near or below the poverty line,109 a smart gun mandate could deny the sec-
tion of the public that is most at risk of violent victimization110 the means 
with which its members could defend themselves. 
D. Practical Limitations That Hinder a Smart Gun Mandate 
The very nature of handgun technology and biometric security technol-
ogy constrains the ways in which they may be combined. A fingerprint or 
palm-print scanner would have to be implemented in the handgun’s grip, 
where it would naturally align with the user’s fingers and palm. The actual 
security interlock preventing operation of the firearm would also have to be 
included—in part in the grip, connected to the fingerprint or palm-print 
scanner, and in part in the action of the firearm, to prevent its functioning. 
Handgun grips, however, are not infinitely expandable—the design of mod-
ern semi-automatic firearms includes the magazine inside the grip,111 which 
drastically limits the space available for biometric security systems. The grip 
must also remain narrow enough that it fits comfortably within the grasp of 
most people, lest the handgun cease to be so. The fingerprint scanner runs 
on battery power; this power further increases the materials that must be 
added to the handgun grip for the biometric security device to function. Al-
 
 107. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
 108. Including rape, sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault. 
 109. NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.
bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4292 (follow “NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool (Up-
dated)” hyperlink; then click the “Custom Tables” tab; then click the “Personal Victimiza-
tion” radio button; then click the “Select Victimization Type” button; then select “2012” in 
each drop-down menu under “Years;” then check the “Serious Violent Victimization” box; 
then choose “Household Income” in the “First Variable” drop-down menu; then click the 
“Generate Results” button; then click the “Percent” link) (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). Thirty-
four point three per cent of victims were members of households with income of $24,999 or 
less. Id. The Department of Health and Human Services poverty guidelines set the poverty 
guideline for the continental United States at $23,550 for a family of four. Annual Update of 
the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 5182 (Jan. 24, 2013). 
 110. Though thirty-four point three per cent of violent crime victims were members of 
households at or below the poverty line, the overall poverty rate in 2012 was fifteen per cent. 
NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool, supra note 102; Carmen DeNavas-Walt and Bernadette 
D. Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2013, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
at 12, Sept. 2014, available at https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
publications/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf. 
 111. See BARRETT, supra note 31, at 9. 
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so, the scanner must be shock-resistant to prevent the shock on firing from 
breaking the weapon.112 
Now let us presume that a fingerprint scanner and its power source 
have been shoehorned into a handgun grip. Will the scanner recognize mul-
tiple people (i.e., family members), or will it be limited to one person?113 
How often will the battery need to be charged or replaced? Will the gun 
work if the battery is dead, or will it become an unwieldy metal and polymer 
bludgeon? A vital aspect of control theory is the idea of fail-safes.114 If a 
device malfunctions, it should revert to a “safe” condition. But for a biomet-
rically secured handgun, which condition is safe? Is reverting to an inopera-
ble condition safe? This would prevent misuse of the handgun if it the gun 
were stolen, to be sure, but the core purpose of the Second Amendment is 
self-defense.115 For a biometrically secured handgun to fail-safe, it could just 
as easily be argued that it must revert to the operable condition on failure of 
the security mechanism—this would allow the law-abiding owner to use the 
firearm for its core purpose despite the malfunction of the security device. 
Given Heller’s disapproval of requirements that weapons be kept inoperable 
in one’s own home,116 a requirement that biometrically-equipped handguns 
revert to the inoperable condition would run afoul of the Second Amend-
ment.117 There is a chance that such a requirement would require the hand-
gun be impossible for the owner to use it for self-defense—the “core lawful 
purpose” of the Amendment.118 
Most importantly, what will happen if the scanner fails? Even current 
fingerprint scanning technology is not foolproof.119 Biometric devices such 
 
 112. See generally, Frequently Asked Questions, BSA OPTICS, 
http://www.bsaoptics.com/questions.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (noting that all of 
BSA’s scopes are shock-proof). 
 113. If it is limited to one person, this again implicates the public policy problems dis-
cussed in Part III.C. A family that is hard-pressed to purchase one handgun can hardly be 
expected to purchase a separate handgun for each adult so that no matter who is home, that 
person may defend himself. 
 114. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 608 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds., 
2001) (defining “fail-safe” as “causing a piece of machinery to revert to a safe condition in 
the event of a breakdown or malfunction”). See also B. WAYNE BEQUETTE, PROCESS 
CONTROL: MODELING, DESIGN, AND SIMULATION 4 (2003) (“The concept of ‘fail-safe’ is 
always important in the selection of instrumentation. For example, a control valve needs an 
energy source to move the valve stem and change the flow . . . . If the valve is air-to-open, 
then the loss of instrument air will cause the valve to close; this is known as a fail-closed 
valve. If, on the other hand, a valve is air-to-close, when instrument air is lost the valve will 
go to its fully open state; this is known as a fail-open valve.”). 
 115. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See generally, id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See, e.g., Anthony Wing Kosner, iPhone 5s Touch ID Fingerprint Scanner is a Fail 
for 20% of Users, Here’s What to Do, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www.forbes.
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as fingerprint scanners can either allow access or deny access—they are 
binary systems. And yet, four possible results exist: (1) the scanner could 
correctly match the fingerprint with the reference (a true positive); (2) the 
scanner could incorrectly match the fingerprint with the reference (a false 
positive); (3) the scanner could correctly determine that the fingerprint does 
not match the reference (a true negative); or (4) the scanner could incorrect-
ly determine that the fingerprint does not match the reference (a false nega-
tive).120 If a smart gun owner uses his weapon against an aggressor without 
issue, or if the aggressor attempts to use the owner’s gun against him or her, 
and in both cases the biometric security system functions as it should, then 
there is no problem. 
In the case of false positives and false negatives, however, the smart 
gun owner should be concerned because a false positive would result in an 
unauthorized user successfully using the owner’s gun against him or her. 
And, a false negative would result in the gun owner being unable to use his 
or her own gun against a home intruder. In either of these situations, the 
policy behind the smart gun mandate—to implement current technology into 
handgun design and thereby handgun owners and their families safer—
would not have been successful. Only more sophisticated scanning and 
comparison software could minimize these occurrences—and more sophisti-
cation comes at a price that consumers must pay through increased prices, 
manufacturers must pay through increased complexity, and the government 
must pay through implementing complex regulatory schemes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As biometric security systems become cheaper, more widely available, 
and more accurate, it seems safe to predict that calls for gun control pro-




 120. See R.S. Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type II Errors 
and the Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 851 (1988) (describing the categories of statistical 
error). 
 121. Even with the technology at its current level, such calls exist. See Nocera, supra note 
3. See also Dave Guston & Ed Finn, The Man with the Personalized Gun, SLATE (Nov. 14, 
2012, 4:41 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/11/skyfall_
someone_should_make_james_bond_s_biometric_walther_ppk_s_gun.html (calling for 
adoption of the biometric scanning technology James Bond’s handgun was equipped with in 
SKYFALL, supra note 7); Michael S. Rosenwald, ‘We Need the iPhone of Guns’: Will Smart 
Guns Transform the Gun Industry?, WASH. POST. (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/local/we-need-the-iphone-of-guns-will-smart-guns-transform-the-gun-industry/
2014/02/17/6ebe76da-8f58-11e3-b227-12a45d109e03_story.html (describing the Armatix 
iP1 as a “dream of gun-control advocates for decades”). Note that the availability of the Ar-
matix iP1 in California triggers the New Jersey mandate. See Nocera, supra note 3. 
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level, however, this technology is not yet ripe for a mandate—it must first 
become cheaper, more reliable, and more energy-efficient. An inexpensive, 
robust biometric security system that could be accessed by multiple family 
members would alleviate many of the practical concerns raised by this 
note,122 though the constitutional concerns would remain. Given the current 
state of biometric technology, such a system is likely several years down the 
road—Heller’s “common use” requirement, however, may prove too power-
ful a roadblock for any smart gun mandate to overcome. 




 122. The “Intelligun” modification for 1911-style handguns addresses some of the con-
cerns raised in this note; it uses a fingerprint-reading device that reportedly functions even 
through blood and sweat and has a failure rate of one in ten thousand. Frank Miniter, The 
Smart-Gun Maker Who Told Holder Off, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Aug. 11, 2014, 4:00 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/385109/smart-gun-maker-who-told-holder-
frank-miniter. This modification, however, only fits 1911-style handguns, and in the event of 
a dead battery, only the police model fails to the unlocked condition—the civilian model 
must be manually unlocked with a key when the battery has died. Id. See also supra note 106. 
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